Articles

1. Article 7 – “The First Node“. On the condition under which a network with no owner can begin at all: a device must be worth owning when it is the only one, the radio itself is already a sensor, and node density has both a floor and a ceiling.

2. Article 8 – “A Network With No Owner, A Reflection With One“. On the person who takes part in nothing and is measured anyway: at 6G frequencies the measurement is a by-product of carrying data rather than a sensor somebody added, which is why data protection instruments do not apply here. The principle that follows is not to forbid measurement but to remove accumulation.

3. “Who Owns What the Network Knows About You” – a review of all eight articles, written for readers who do not work in telecommunications. It sets out the single question the series asks, what the architecture would give an ordinary person, and – just as plainly – when that person does not need it and what it costs. It closes with a table of one line per article.

Contribution documents (both version 2.0, July 2026, superseding all earlier drafts)

4. “Density as an Availability Condition for Environment-Dependent Trust Roots” – the         P-DENS and P-OBS principles. The earlier contributions specified the integrity of trust roots; none specified their availability. Two of the four carriers that make the quorum affordable are not on the device, and their readiness is a function of node density, which no requirement in the framework declares. R12 requires availability conditions to be declared and correct degradation to be verified; P-DENS requires standalone utility at zero neighbours, autonomous adaptation to measured density, and both a floor and a ceiling per environment; P-OBS answers the incentive question through the exchange of non-substitutable local observation; R21 requires every requirement to be classified as demonstrable or merely attested. The document also names what it does not solve – the passive aggregator.

5. “Bounded Observation” – the companion privacy specification for environment-observation tags. What makes the exchange valuable is what makes it dangerous: a device that publishes what it observes publishes something about people who published nothing. The threat model is centred on the non-participant, and eight requirements, R13 to R20, cover abstraction, a closed predicate list, publication limits, evaporation, unlinkability, opt-out, local processing and auditability. They apply in a fixed order rather than in parallel, because limiting how often something is published achieves almost nothing while each item remains rich. Annex A derives that ordering and specifies the protocol for obtaining the numerical parameters, which do not yet exist.